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THE WEAK CASE FOR CONVERSION LEGISLATION 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The likelihood of substantial cutbacks in the military budget has focused attention 
on the hitherto arcane subject of "defense conversion" and on a perennial proposal which 
until recently has been ignored. Since 1977, Representative Ted Weiss (D-NY) has been 
introducing legislation on defense conversion, but no bill has passed, or even come up for a 
vote. However, congressional interest in the subject is growing, as demonstrated by recent 
hearings on the Weiss bill. 
The congressional hearings to date have been dominated by uncritical supporters of 
Congressman Weiss' bill. They have presented a minimum of analysis of how the 
ambitious program of "economic conversion" would work. Under the circumstances, it 
would seem useful to examine the specific provisions of Weiss' proposed legislation and of 
his supporting statements.1 
Key Features of the Weiss Conversion Report 
The essence of Weiss' approach is to require each defense plant to set up joint 
business-labor "alternative use committees" to develop plans for shifting production to 
peacetime use when defense contracts get canceled. The bill also would establish a public-
private Defense Economic Adjustment Council to oversee the entire process and to 
provide support and guidance. The latter would be an official part of the federal 
government. 
Alternative Use Committees 
Each military facility of 100 or more employees would be required to set up an 
alternative use committee.2 The notion of a military facility is defined very broadly. It 
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covers any plant or establishment used under a defense contract, no matter how small and 
including subcontractors and suppliers. In its present form, the proposal would cover every 
business, no matter how small a share of activity is devoted to defense work, so long as 100 
or more people are on the payroll. 
There is no indication as to how many of the tens of thousands of defense 
contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers would be covered. Nor is any justification 
provided for the use of 100 employees as the cut-off point, although Congressman Weiss 
indicates that the specific number is negotiable. 
Each committee would have at least eight members and be made up of equal 
numbers of management and labor representatives. The labor representatives are to 
include members of union bargaining units and democratically elected representatives of 
unorganized workers. In addition, every locality within which the facility is located may 
appoint nonvoting representatives to the committee, who would participate in an advisory 
capacity. 
Each committee is directed to prepare, in advance, plans for converting the facility 
and its resources to the manufacture of civilian products. These plans would be deyeloped 
and implemented if there was a "substantial" cutback, reduction or elimination of the 
facility's defense contracts. 
Each alternative use committee is given a broad mandate. First of all, it is to 
evaluate the assets of the defense facility and the resources and requirements of the local 
community in terms of physical property, manpower skills and expertise, accessibility, 
environment, and economic needs. 
No guidance is provided as to what are the "requirements" of a locality or its 
"economic needs." These are vague, undefined notions which cannot be quantified in any 
objective sense. We can presume, given the thrust of Congressman Weiss' testimony, that 
this provision refers to maintaining the status quo in each locality covered by the bill. As 
he stated in the Congressional Record when introducing the 1989 version of the bill, "The 
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Defense Economic Adjustment Act provides a detailed plan for preserving the jobs of 
those affected by decisions to eliminate unnecessary military spending." 
The second function of the alternative use committee is to develop detailed plans 
for converting the facility to "efficient, non-defense-related productive activity." The plans 
are intended to provide the local community and the employees of the defense facility with 
"a viable and workable blueprint for the conversion of the facility." 
One must wonder whether Congressman Weiss knows the high attrition rate of new 
products and new businesses in the civilian economy. The expectations that would be 
engendered by the bill are, to put it kindly, inconsistent with the experiences of mortal men 
and women. The circumstances triggering such plans are unusually vague: 
... in the event the facility is affected by a government decision to 
reduce, modify, or close the facility, terminate any defense contracts, or 
disapprove a license to sell or export defense materials to nongovernmental 
parties .... 
It is doubtful whether the author of this provision appreciates its vast sweep. In the 
case of each of the larger (and many medium-size contractors) there is a constant ebb and 
flow of contracts, old ones being terminated and new ones being signed. Conceivably, the 
cancellation of the smallest contract would trigger the conversion activity even if the same 
firm simultaneously received a massive multi-billion dollar new defense order to be 
produced at the same facility. Conversely, a "defense facility" would have to actuate its 
"conversion plan" even if defense business represented an infinitesimal portion of its total 
activity -- and even if that nondefense portion were rising rapidly. Also, it is not apparent 
why disapproving a single export license should be sufficient grounds to convert the entire 
facility. 
At this point, let us examine the stipulated content of the required conversion plan. 
Each plan shall "maximize" the extent to which the personnel required for the "efficient" 
operation of the converted facility can be drawn from people with the types and levels of 
skills possessed by the employees of the facility prior to its conversion. Then the plan must 
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specify the numbers of personneL by type and level of skill, employed at the facility prior to 
conversion, who~e continued employment is not consistent with the efficient operation of 
the facility after conversion. 
How anyone could be precise in making such estimates defies the imagination. 
What company knows in advance the exact number and type of products that it will 
produce in markets new to it, much less the precise number and type of people required 
under those circumstances? Such rigidity exceeds the normal defense production process; 
it certainly is foreign to the dynamic civilian economy. 
The next part of the plan is to specify the number of new positions, by level and 
type of skill, that would be required. Again, how could anyone make more than the 
roughest guess? But the planners would also have to specify "in detail" the new plant and 
equipment, and modification to existing plant and equipment, required for the converted 
facility. The capstone would be a financial plan, including an estimate of financing 
requirements. 
Nowhere is there any acknowledgement of the many unsuccessful diversification 
efforts on the part of defense contractors nor of the findings of the various postmortems 
that have been performed. Inevitably, however, a few special interests are served. Each 
plan must provide for extending the labor contract to workers until conversion to non-
defense-related operations is completed -- which, it is specified, cannot last more than two 
years. 
For employees displaced by the closing of a defense plant, each committee shall 
provide occupational retraining and reemployment counseling services -- or ensure that 
such retraining and services are provided by other federal, state;or local agencies. 
The degree of compulsion in the planning and implementation activity is awesome. 
Any contractor which fails to submit an alternative use plan or refuses or fails to carry it 
out shall be barred from future defense contracts for three years, forfeit termination 
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payments due it on existing or recently cancelled contracts, and lose eligibility for tax 
credits. 
The Defense Economic Adjustment Council 
The Weiss proposal also would establish a 22 member Defense Economic 
Adjustment Council to oversee the entire conversion effort. The Council would consist of 
10 cabinet officers and other senior federal officials, six representatives of the "business-
management community" to represent nondefense business, and six from labor unions. 
The idea that a committee with a majority of private citizens would exercise the powers of 
the federal government is certainly an innovation in political science. In the past, such joint 
committees have been limited to advisory roles. 
A new Office of Economic Adjustment would be established to provide staff 
support for the Council. Given the responsibility placed on the Council, a substantial staff 
would be necessary. 
The Defense Economic Adjustment Council would be more than a coordinating 
and advising body. It would establish the criteria for assistance, determine which 
communities are eligible, and rule on appeals. It also would rule on disputes on the sale or 
lease of surplus property to localities. Moreover, it is expected to quickly solve the key 
problems that perennially face decisionmakers entering new lines of business. It would 
have to do so by responding to the provision ordering it to prepare and distribute a 
Conversion Guidelines Handbook which shall contain the following: 
• the basic requirements of programs for professional retraining of managerial 
personnel to reorient them to the management of civilian enterprise (failure to take 
the program would bar the people from the financial benefits described in the 
section "Assistance to Workers," which follows), 
• the basic requirements for the length and nature of occupational retraining for 
production workers and junior level administrative employees, 
.. 
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• a checklist of critical points requiring attention at each stage of the conversion 
process. 
The Council also would solicit, direct and coordinate "concrete plans" for civilian 
public projects, addressing "vital areas of national concern." The proposed legislation 
refers to alternative use plans "approved" by the Council, but makes no provision for any 
process of submitting, reviewing or approving such plans. 
One year of advance notification would be required of plans to cut back or 
terminate a defense contract or a military base. The Defense Economic Adjustment 
Council would be responsible for informing local officials and alternative use committees 
of pending cutbacks. Because the federal budget is sent up to the Congress about 7 months 
before the start of a fiscal year, the notification requirement would mean, in practice, 
notice of 1-1/2 years before the actual cutback. The scope of the notifications would be 
very broad, covering "reduction, technical changes, or elimination of a program .... " Given 
the hundreds of technical changes that are normally made in the course of producing a 
single weapon system, the paperwork flow would be substantial. 
Assistance to Workers 
All employees who lose their jobs ("in whole or in part") by a cutback in the volume 
of defense work at the facility are eligtble for two years to benefits equal to 90 percent of 
the first $20,000 of annual earnings and 50 percent of the next $5,000. (The benefits would 
be reduced by government unemployment compensation and actual earnings). Those who 
lose their jobs within six months prior to the "reduction of the volume of defense work" also 
receive the benefits. No explanation is given for that windfall, or more generally, why 
unemployed defense workers should be treated so much more generously than other 
unemployed people. 
Unemployed defense workers would be eligible for job search allowances similar to 
those provided under the Trade Act of 1974. They also would be reimbursed for 
"reasonable" relocation expenses incurred in moving to another location in order to take 
( 
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advantage of a civilian employment opportunity to which the worker is referred or which is 
determined to ~ suitable by the Secretary of Labor. 
All managerial and technical employees who have spent more than half of the 
preceding decade working in defense-related jobs must participate in or have completed a 
program of "professional retraining" to be eligible for the fmancial assistance. The 
program must meet the requirements specified in the Conversion Guidelines Handbook. 
In addition, the employer would have to continue paying into the employees' 
pension fund in behalf of each of those laid off workers for a period of two years. Also, the 
employer would be required to maintain for two years any medical and life insurance 
coverage which was in force when the employee was working. There is no provision for 
recovering these large costs under defense contracts. It would not be surprising, if such 
benefits were required, that many companies -- especially the smaller ones -- would declare 
bankruptcy as soon as their defense contracts were cancelled when faced with these 
expensive burdens. 
Benefits to Communities 
Federal adjustment assistance of undesignated amounts would be provided.for 
communities and workers while a defense facility was being "converted." Communities 
"seriously" affected by defense cutbacks also would be eligible for federal planning 
assistance. It is not clear whether the communities would request the financial support 
after the defense cutback was announced or after it actually occurred. But it is interesting 
to note that the defense companies are expected to put their plans into practice as soon as 
the cutback is announced, while the localities would only begin planning at that point. 
Congressman Weiss views the role of the Defense Economic Adjustment Council 
as providing pertinent planning information to localities. The Council would also 
encourage regional and national discussion and planning to provide information "indicating 
where local people should be looking to see what they should be doing." That supposedly 
would serve as a guide for "what the economy really needs . ..3 
.. 
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There seems to be no understanding, in this section of the proposal or elsewhere, 
that not every cutback announced by the Pentagon takes place. Congress is not exactly a 
rubber stamp. Proposed cut-backs by the Department of Defense would trigger all sorts of 
"conversion" activity by the communities and companies affected, even if Congress decides 
not to go along with the proposed action. The needless uncertainty and wheelspinning 
engendered by the Weiss proposal could be awesome. 
Cost and Financing 
No estimate of cost is contained in any of the materials accompanying 
Representative Weiss' proposals. When asked about the cost he replied, "I think it is really 
almost impossible to project." 
He has suggested several methods of financing in his congressional testimony. One 
is to allocate 1-2 percent of the defense procurement budget for "economic conversion 
purposes." H.R. 101 requires that 1-1/4 percent of each defense contractor's sales to the 
Department of Defense be used for economic conversion purposes. Either approach 
would represent a major new federal spending program, in excess of $1 billion a year. 
Analysis or the Conversion Legislation 
Proponents' Objectives 
During every period of substantial reduction in defense spending a popular 
response emerges: the high-powered resources previously devoted to defense are too 
valuable to lie fallow; they should be utilized to deal with the various shortcomings in our 
society, generally through the public sector. It is not surprising that unemployed defense 
workers -- and those who fear that they soon will be laid off -- urge the government to 
spend money to keep them busy. Nor is it unusual for other citizens to think of periods of 
defense cutbacks as a good opportunity to use science and engineering in civilian pursuits. 
However, much of the support for the current legislative proposals to "convert" 
defense industries to civilian tasks arises from a different - and essentially noneconomic --
set of concerns. Many people and organizations who favor lower levels of military outlays 
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fear that citizens will resist large defense cutbacks because they may result in many people 
losing their jobs.· Hence, in order to defuse the opposition to lower military spending, 
leaders in the peace movement seek to convince the public that attractive civilian 
alternatives exist for defense contractors. Congressman Weiss is very clear on that point: 
By creating viable alternatives to military spending, economic 
conversion would assure the millions of workers in military dependent 
industries that their jobs will not be sacrificed in the effort to achieve 
meaningful arms control. ... Thi~ would significantly enhance the prospects 
for ending the nuclear arms race. 
Professor J. Davidson Alexander is even more specific: "Fear of economic losses 
entailed by cutbacks, without comprehensive advanced planning to protect particular 
people in particular workplaces, marshalls substantial opposition to military cutbacks . ..5 
Alternative Views on Defense Spending 
At first blush, it is hard to take Representative Weiss' conversion proposal 
seriously. It is composed of equal parts of naivete and wishful thinking. One clear fallacy 
of this line of thinking is the simple-minded assumption that people who object to large 
defense cutbacks do so solely out of economic self-interest. That may be the case for quite 
a few who are directly involved in defense work, but it ignores several more basic factors. 
First of all, many people whose incomes and jobs are not at all affected support 
high levels of defense because they view the world differently than the advocates of 
conversion. That is, they believe that the United States exists in a dangerous international 
environment, with potential threats coming from such varied sources as terrorist gangs, 
tribal warfare, and small nations with atomic capability, as well as conventional "super 
power" rivalry. Thus, they sincerely believe, a high level of defense (although not 
necessarily the current amount) is needed for the nation's welfare. 
Lessons from Experience 
The second shortcoming of the "conversion" position is the adverse experience of 
the past. Previous efforts - public and private - to force-feed the transition from military 
to civilian pursuits have generated a disproportionately large number of failures. The most 
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comprehensive studies of past attempts by large defense contractors to use their 
capabilities beyond the aerospace market have been unable to find any important examples 
of successes.6 The failed diversification efforts cover the entire period since the end of 
World War II. The unsuccessful efforts include product lines ranging from canoes to 
computers to coffins. 
The most enthusiastic supporters of conversion planning acknowledge the sad 
history of previous defense industry diversification efforts. Professor Seymour Melman, 
whom Congressman Weiss acknowledges as the intellectual guru of the conversion 
movement, has written that "close scrutiny suggests that managements of the ... military-
industrial firm are infused with a strained incapacity for operating civilian enterprises 
functioning in the civilian marketplace." 7 
Representative Weiss uses even stronger language: 
Thus, unlike most firms in a free enterprise system, their [defense 
firms'] focus is not on making cheaper or better products .... Often, these 
firms manufacture products which are essentially usel~ to the civilian 
population and uncompetitive in international markets. 
Although Melman and Weiss are entirely too negative in assessing the overall 
capabilities of defense contractors, they do focus on the difficulty these companies 
encounter when they try to use their defense capabilities in the civilian economy. 
There are numerous reasons for that shortcoming. Given the nature of the 
military's needs, defense companies are geared to low volume production of expensive, 
specialized equipment, which rarely incorporate the tradeoff's between quality and price so 
common in commercial markets. These fums produce under detailed government 
supervision which generates large overhead costs. Moreover, the major defense 
contractors lack the marketing and distribution systems required in the consumer-oriented 
economy. 
There is a third point that is ignored by the conversion advocates: the need to 
maintain an adequate research, development and production base for defense should the 
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current optimistic view of the international climate undergo another shift. Sadly, history 
provides numerous examples of the cyclical nature of superpower relations and of the 
abrupt shift from belligerency to "glasnost" -- or "detente" -- and back again. Surely, China, 
the Middle East, and Central America provide examples of unstable situations that could 
generate future threats to our national security. 
The fourth shortcoming of a "conversion" strategy is that it focuses on keeping 
existing jobs in place. If that approach were followed, it would be a recipe for stagnation. 
The adjustments required by defense cutbacks are not basically different from the 
responses that regularly occur from shifts in consumer demand or in the pattern of foreign 
trade or from the introduction of new products that render existing products obsolete. 
The fifth shortcoming of the conversion approach may be the most compelling. 
Peace is not about to break out and the reductions in the military budget are not likely to 
be overwhelming. Compared to the 2 percent annual reductions in real military spending 
previously planned, we might experience perhaps a 4 percent annual cut. The resultant 
"savings" would not be enough to bring the budget deficit below S 100 billion a year. 
Conclusion 
It seems clear that the limited ability to transfer defense technology to civilian uses 
has not been due to lack of trying. If the companies on their own want to continue such 
high risk attempts, we should wish them well. But "conversion" does not seem to be an 
attractive use of taxpayer money and, directly or indirectly, the money for "conversion" 
would be taken from the funds voted by the Congress for national defense purposes. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, the "conversion" process would be a major 
step toward increased governmental control of private business. In view of the vagueness 
with which its provisions are drawn, enactment of bills like the proposed Defense 
Economic Adjustment Act would provide a field day for disputatious lawyers, bureaucrats 
anxious to expand their turf, and consultants who want to develop plans to increase the 




Even more scary is the statement by the editors of a recent book on economic 
conversion that,."It is a model that can be enormously effective when applied to any 
production facility whose product is no longer in demand, or competitive on national or 
international markets.•9 We are also told that conversion advocates are as concerned with 
what is produced and how goods are produced as they are in job creation and maintenance. 
Finally, we come to the hidden agenda of the conversion advocates -- to move away 
from the market-oriented private enterprise system. There is no need to guess. We can 
refer to their own words: 
Conversion advocates therefore recognize that the conversion 
process must help working people and their communities frame a new 
series of choices and that these must be centered around the concept of 
socially useful production, rather than prod~t)lion that merely serves the 
profit requirements of corporate managers. 
The conversion debate thus is really a dispute about the role and power of 
government in our society. The answer seems clear: In a period of budget stringency, 
there is no compelling case for devoting public resources to force feeding such "conversion" 
efforts. Nor is it obvious why public policy should interfere with the voluntary shift of 
resources to other sectors of the economy. Indeed, a large reduction in defense sp~nding --
and a concomitant reduction in federal deficit fmancing -- would be a welcome opportunity 
for increasing the extent to which consumers, producers, and investors make their own 
decisions on the use of their income and wealth. 
I 
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